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Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act: Taxpayers' Remedy or 
Political Placebo? 
Thomas Treadway lived with his girlfriend, Shirley Lojeski, on her 
Pennsylvania farm. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited 
Treadway for tax-years 1977 through 1980 and determined that he 
owed $247,000 in back taxes, penalties, and interest. 1 Fearing that 
collection of this sum was uncertain, the IRS brought a jeopardy2 and 
termination3 assessment against Treadway, 4 allowing an immediate 
seizure of his property. Believing further that Treadway had trans-
ferred assets to Lojeski, a Revenue Officer also filed a lien on Lojeski's 
farm and levied on her bank account. 5 
On administrative appeal, Treadway recovered the $247,000, but 
his battle with the IRS exacted a heavy toll: Treadway incurred 
$75,000 in legal and accounting fees and lost both his job and virtually 
all his assets in the process.6 Lojeski paid over $30,000 in such fees7 
and claimed damages (which were not recovered) arising from the , 
threatened foreclosure on her farm, the lost opportunity to sell the 
farm, the suspension of her horse breeding business, and other wrong-
ful IRS actions. s 
Treadway and Lojeski's horror stories, along with many others, 
prompted Senator David Pryor (D.-Ark) to introduce the Omnibus , 
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act in 1987.9 This legislation purports to 
increase taxpayers' awareness of their rights during an IRS audit10 and 
to enhance the procedural safeguards available to taxpayers during an 
audit. Specifically, 11 the bill would stem the allegedly commonplace 
1. Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1986). 
2. See I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1982); see also note 91 infra; I.R.C. § 6331(a) (1982). Section 
6331(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury [hereinafter "the Secretary"] to immediately 
levy against the taxpayer's property when the Code's jeopardy provision applies. 
3. See I.R.C. § 6851 (1982) (requiring immediate determination and collection of tax liabil-
ity where taxpayer designs to depart the United States quickly, remove property from the United 
States, or do anything prejudicial to the IRS' collection of taxes). See also note 91 infra. 
4. 788 F.2d at 197. 
5. 788 F.2d at 197. 
6. The Burlington Free Press, May 20, 1987, at IOA, col. 1. 
7. Id. 
8. 788 F.2d at 197. 
9. S. 1774, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REC. S13,891-99 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) [here-
inafter S. 1774]. Twin legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 
3470, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See generally Pryor, The Near-Totalitarian LR.S., N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 15, 1988, at 27, col. 2; Cramer, Putting a Leash on the IRS, TIME, Apr. 11, 1988, at 
49 (describing motives for the proposed legislation). 
10. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 2(a). 
11. This Note does not analyze all aspects of the bill, but rather concentrates on reforms 
aimed at audit and investigation rights, collections, and damages. 
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IRS practice of disregarding a taxpayer's validly executed power of 
attorney and communicating directly with the taxpayer to his detri-
ment. I2 The IRS would also be required to conduct audits at a time 
and place reasonable to both the taxpayer and the IRS. I3 The bill 
would further protect taxpayers' privacy by preventing the IRS from 
gathering or retaining information not relevant to the determination 
or collection of taxes. I4 Second, the bill seeks to eliminate the unfair 
surprise and inadequate notice inherent in present Internal Revenue 
Code (the "Code") provisions governing tax collections. Is Thus, the 
bill would provide more equitable procedures for installment payment 
oftaxesI6 and require that IRS tax-related property seizures make eco-
nomic sense.17 Finally, the bill would permit the taxpayer to recover 
damages from the IRS for certain Code violations. Is 
This Note examines whether the bill, as drafted, addresses the 
problems which spawned it. It anticipates the bill's effects on existing 
law and identifies areas where the bill would likely create new 
problems in the administration of the federal tax laws. It further iden-
tifies areas where the bill would solve problems. This Note concludes 
that (1) the bill's audit provisions will not significantly expand tax-
payer rights, and may in fact disrupt the audit process; (2) except for 
safeguards for installment agreements, the bill's attempts to reform 
IRS collections procedures will not achieve its intended objectives; and 
(3) the bill's damages provision, if properly construed by the courts, 
will serve to reform IRS abuses. 
This Note has five parts. Part I, "Legislative Background," de-
scribes the bill's origins and provides reasons for its introduction. Part 
II, "IRS Audits and Investigations," analyzes the audit process from 
the viewpoint of both taxpayer rights and IRS administration. Specifi-
cally, Part II discusses four aspects of the audit and taxpayer investi-
gations process: (1) audit time and place; (2) the statutory right to 
record interviews; (3) the power of attorney and (4) taxpayer surveil-
lance. Part II also discusses the legal effect of the Internal Revenue 
Manual in light of the Administrative Procedure Act. Part III, "IRS 
Collections Procedures," critiques three aspects of the bill, including 
(1) the mechanics of the lien and levy proposals, (2) installment pay-
ment provisions, and (3) uneconomical levy provisions. Part IV, 
"Damages Provision," examines the relative merits of the bill's provi-
sion that permits taxpayers to obtain damages against the IRS for cer-
12. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
13. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3; see also notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text. 
14. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 24; see also notes 70-77 infra and accompanying text. 
15. S. 1774, supra note 9, §§ 12-16, 18; see also notes 89-140 infra and accompanying text. 
16. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 12; see also notes 116-27 infra and accompanying text. 
17. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 13; see also notes 129-40 infra and accompanying text. 
18. S. 1774, supra note 9, §§ 22-23; see also notes 141-74 infra and accompanying text. 
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tain Code violations. This Part first identifies defects in the existing 
Code by examining Code safeguards against IRS overreaching in the 
lien and levy area. In addition, Part IV discusses whether the bill ade-
quately addresses those defects. Finally, Part V summarizes the bene-
fits and drawbacks of the bill and suggests amendments or deletions 
which would expand taxpayer rights while simultaneously improving 
IRS administration. 
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
Congressional attempts to reform IRS audit and collection prac-
tices are hardly novel. In 1980, the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs compiled an extensive history of IRS violations of its own for-
mal policies.19 These violations included excesses similar to those 
faced by Lojeski and Treadway.20 
IRS abuses are, to an extent, products of the federal budget deficit 
and resulting budget constraints. 21 Loathe to increase taxes, Congress 
has sought to enhance revenues through increased appropriations to 
IRS collection activities.22 To the extent that IRS seizure and levy 
activity is an indication, Congress' efforts to stress tax collections in 
lieu of tax increases have borne fruit: From fiscal year 1981 to 1986, 
IRS property seizures increased 154 percent and levies grew by more 
than 119 percent.23 Yet during the same period, tax delinquencies 
rose by only 35 percent.24 
19. See generally SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE 
CoMMITfEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE CoLLECTION PRACTICES - IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES (Comm. Print 1980) [herein-
after SMALL BUSINESS REPORT]. 
20. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. In Lojeski's case, the IRS violated its own 
internal policies, but the court denied recovery because she could not demonstrate detrimental 
reliance on those policies. Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1986). 
21. See Steuerle, Who Should Pay for Collecting Taxes?, TAX NOTES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 99 
(excerpted from c. STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR CoLLECTING TAXES? - FINANCING 
THE IRS (1986)). 
22. See Gutfeld, Overtaxed Agency: IRS Faces Pressure To Raise Collections - But Not Get 
Tough, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 6. 
23. See Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights: Hearings on S. 604 Before the Subcomm. on 
Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Comm. on 
Finance, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 13 (1987) (statement of Sen. Levin) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on S. 604]. 
24. Id. A deficiency is the amount of tax due, determined by the IRS, less the excess of (1) 
the sum of (a) the amount of tax shown on the taxpayer's return and (b) the amounts previously 
assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency over (2) the amount of certain statutory 
rebates. See I.R.C. § 621 l(a) (1982). The amount of statutory rebates includes certain abate-
ments, credits, refunds, or other repayments based on a determination that taxes were less than 
the previously defined excess computation. See I.R.C. § 621 l(a)(2) (1982). If a taxpayer incurs 
an unsatisfied deficiency, it becomes a delinquency, and is subject to collection action. However, 
the taxpayer may stay collection under certain Code provisions. See note 95 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
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Additional congressional collections appropriations hinge on the 
IRS' ability to collect incremental revenues that exceed those appro-
priations. Despite IRS National Office policy to the contrary, some 
believe the IRS imposes de facto collections quotas on its collections 
employees.25 As one would expect, the IRS justifies congressional col-
lections appropriations by favorably expressing tax collections reve-
nues as a multiple of collections costs.26 
Senator Pryor's response to the perceived collections quotas was to 
codify the IRS National Office's prohibition on such quotas. The bill 
thus forbids both tax enforcement production quotas and the use of 
enforcement results to evaluate IRS employee performance.27 Ironi-
cally, Congress has ineffectively addressed taxpayer service problems, 
despite mounting congressional sympathy for improving the quality of 
taxpayer service, in order to enhance the IRS' public image. 28 Ac-
cording to this view, the public's sense of justice, and ultimately its 
confidence in the voluntary compliance system, would be improved if 
the IRS was more impartial, more responsive, and more competent.29 
But assessing the economic benefit of public confidence in the volun-
tary compliance system is difficult, as there are few dollar-based mea-
sures. Accordingly, Congress has been less enthusiastic about 
taxpayer service than it has been about collections. Thus, taxpayer 
service problems persist.30 However, while chiefly designed to curb 
perceived IRS abuses, the bill nevertheless reflects this congressional 
sensitivity to taxpayer service. For example, the bill requires that the 
IRS give the taxpayer reasons for deficiencies and penalties.31 
While Congress' chief concern has been collections, the IRS be-
lieves that the problems targeted by the bill are better addressed by 
modifying the agency's internal procedures.32 The National Treasury 
25. See Hearings on S. 604, supra note 23, at 76-79 (statement of Robert Tobias, National 
President of the National Treasury Employees Union). 
26. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Ap· 
propriations of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 511 (1987), reprinted 
in TAX NOTES, microfiche database doc. 87-1264 (1987) (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Com· 
missioner of Internal Revenue) ("Included in our FY 1988 budget, is an investment of $400 
million which will result in an additional $2.4 billion being brought into the Treasury."). 
27. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 7. 
28. See Revenue Agents Say Collections Are Top Priority, TAX NOTES, June 29, 1987, at 1265 
("Congress has become increasingly concerned about taxpayer services, the public's perception of 
the IRS, and the subsequent effect on voluntary compliance."). 
29. See Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, TAX NOTES, July 6, 1987, at 98-99 ("Reduc· 
ing perceptions of arbitrariness and unfairness can increase greatly overall compliance •••• Jus-
tice is enhanced ..• by having adequate mechanisms for dispute resolution that ••• encourage 
prompt decisionmaking."). 
30. Gutfeld, supra note 22, at 4, col. 3 ("people calling the IRS received incorrect answers to 
their questions 21 % of the time"). See also Gutfeld, IRS Staffers Are Ready to Assist Taxpayers, 
but Not Always Able, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 25, col. 4. 
31. S. 1774, supra note 9, §§ 10-11. 
32. See Gibbs Criticizes Bill of Rights Proposals, 67 J. TAXN. 266 (1987) (IRS Commissioner 
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Employees Union agrees, but believes that IRS management practices 
must change. The Union cites pressure to meet levy and seizure goals 
as a major reason for the seemingly unreasonable actions undertaken 
by IRS revenue officers. 33 If Lojeski and Treadway's case is indicative, 
revenue officers are under such excessive pressure that they neither 
follow IRS internal procedures34 nor are they disciplined for those vio-
lations. Indeed, the offending agent in that case was later promoted!35 
Having described this legislative background, this Note now turns to 
an evaluation of the bill's provisions involving audits and invest-
igations. 
II. IRS AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS 
A. New Provisions 
This Part examines four provisions of the bill respecting IRS audits 
and investigations: (1) audit time and place; (2) the statutory right to 
record interviews; (3) the power of attorney; and ( 4) taxpayer surveil-
lance. It draws the following conclusions concerning these provisions: 
The audit time and place provisions either merely duplicate the ex-
isting Code, or needlessly disrupt audits. The right to record and 
power of attorney provisions expand taxpayer rights, but lack effective 
remedies for their violation. The taxpayer surveillance provision adds 
no meaningful taxpayer right, while potentially harming legitimate 
IRS enforcement efforts. 
1. Audit Time and Place 
The bill states that any IRS interview with a taxpayer in connec-
tion with a deficiency must be conducted "at a reasonable time and 
place convenient to the taxpayer and [the IRS] officer or em-
ployee .... "36 This Note argues that this provision adds nothing to 
the existing Code. The Code already stipulates that the time and place 
of the examination shall be reasonable under the circumstances. 37 
Moreover, the Code requires that examinations be scheduled at least 
indicating that "the Service is implementing an analytical process inside the agency to deal with 
taxpayer rights problems"). 
33. See SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 19, at 22 (outlining severe sanctions against 
revenue officers who fail to meet collections quotas). The IRS practice of measuring revenue 
officer collections performance based on the number of seizures and levies, rather than on the 
dollar value of taxes collected, aggravates this problem. Id. at 22-25. Confidence in the volun-
tary compliance system could suffer accordingly. Ironically, it is often the most cooperative 
taxpayer who is targeted for collection action. Id. at 25. 
34. See Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1986) (revenue officer failed to obtain 
approval of IRS Regional Counsel as required by 2 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 5424.33). 
35. The Burlington Free Press, May 20, 1987, at lOA, col. 2. 
36. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
37. I.R.C. § 7605(a) (1982). 
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ten days after the date of summons. 38 Therefore, this provision simply 
duplicates the existing Code. 
The IRS generally conducts its audits in the IRS District where 
the taxpayer lives. 39 The Service will, however, consider taxpayer re-
quests for a transfer of the audit to a more convenient district, but 
there is no standard for reviewing such requests, and such determina-
tions seem to be left to IRS discretion.40 To reviewing courts, the time 
and place of audit is a matter of administrative detail, and they con-
sider only whether responsiveness to taxpayer needs interferes with the 
IRS' ability to conduct audits.41 
Any effort to reform audit logistics in the name of taxpayer con-
venience must consider the potential for interference with the audit 
process. The bill permits a taxpayer to discontinue an interview (au-
dit) to consult with an attorney, C.P.A., enrolled agent, or enrolled 
actuary.42 Under present law, taxpayers may not enjoin audits, even if 
they are designed to harass.43 While taxpayers may have too little 
control of audits under current law, giving them unchecked powers to 
discontinue audits has real potential to disrupt bona fide tax-related 
inquiries. Like the bill's power of attorney provision, 44 there should be 
an exception to audit discontinuation powers when the discontinua-
tion unreasonably delays or hinders the audit. 
In light of the present safeguards, the need for the audit-conve-
nience provision is baffiing. For example, the reasonableness of time 
and place of the audit, as required by l.R.C. section 7605(a), would 
likely be held by a reviewing court not to be met in a case where the 
IRS requires the taxpayer to travel to a distant IRS office. Thus, the 
audit convenience provision does little or nothing to expand taxpayer 
rights. 
2. Statutory Right To Record Interviews 
The following section discusses the protections afforded by the 
bill's provision allowing taxpayers to record audits. The analysis first 
contrasts this provision to existing law, and identifies proof problems 
38. I.R.C. § 7605(a) (1982). 
39. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 'TREASURY, PUB. No. 556, 
EXAMINATION OF RETURNS, APPEAL RIGHTS, AND Cl.AIMS FOR REFUND 1 (Rev. Nov. 1986) 
[hereinafter IRS PUB. 556]. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. United Distillers Prods., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946). 
42. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. As employed by the IRS, the terms "audit" and "examina· 
tion" are synonymous. See IRS PUB. 556, supra note 39, at 1. The governing Code sections use 
the term "examination." See I.R.C. §§ 7602, 7605 (1982). Webster defines "interview" as a 
"meeting at whieh information is obtained •.• from a person." WEBSTER'S NEW CoLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 600 (1979). One may infer that this provision of the bill governs IRS examinations 
involving personal contact between the IRS and the taxpayer. 
43. See Keese v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 85, 89 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
44. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
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inherent in the bill's remedies available to taxpayers for IRS breach of 
the right-to-record. Second, the discussion illustrates these proof 
problems through a hypothetical fact situation. 
a. Bill provisions and analysis. A taxpayer may, under the bill's 
provisions, record IRS interviews ("audits").45 There is no existing 
Code provision granting taxpayers the right to record IRS interviews, 
but the Internal Revenue Manual permits the taxpayer to record an 
IRS interview when (1) it is approved by an IRS group manager; 
(2) the taxpayer or his representative furnishes the recording equip-
ment; (3) the IRS is also permitted to make its own recording; and 
( 4) the recording occurs at a suitable location, normally an IRS 
office.46 
This Internal Revenue Manual provision was enacted in response 
to a 1963 district court decision, Mott v. MacMahon, 47 which an-
nounced a judicially created right to have a certified shorthand re-
porter record the audit at the taxpayer's expense. The Mott court 
reasoned that a certified shorthand reporter presented no obstacle to 
the orderly discharge of IRS objectives and considered other settings 
where a right to a reporter promoted the interest of "orderly proce-
dure in the administration of justice."48 This judicially created right 
to record an audit has been extended no further than the provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Manual. Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 
for example, have adhered to the letter of the Manual in denying tax-
payers the right to videotape audits.49 
With the exception of expanding permissible recording media be-
yond a shorthand reporter, the bill's provision does little more than 
codify the Internal Revenue Manual and the result obtained in Mott. 
However, this codification does change the legal effect of the present 
Internal Revenue Manual provisions. 50 Although the bill creates a 
new right, it proposes an insufficient remedy. 
The bill's remedy for IRS failure to observe the statutory right to 
record audits is inadequate. The bill's right-to-record provision itself 
provides no relief, limiting the taxpayer to an action for damages 
under a separate provision prohibiting unreasonable actions by the 
IRS.51 Under that provision, the taxpayer may recover the damages 
resulting from the IRS' failure to adhere to the statute. 
45. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
46. 2 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 4245.1, at 7309-223 to -24 (Sept. 4, 1985). 
47. 214 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Cal. 1963). 
48. 214 F. Supp. at 23-24 (citing Gonzi v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 586, 335 P.2d 97 
(1959)). 
49. United States v. Black, 804 F.2d 1416, 1417 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Huene, 745 
F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985). 
50. See discussion at Part 11.B infra. 
51. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. 
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In the case of a denial of recording, there will be an obvious prob-
lem of proof concerning damages. After all, the taxpayer would pre-
sumably need to demonstrate prejudice; namely that, but for the IRS 
violation, there would have been no deficiency or a smaller-than-as-
sessed deficiency. Once prejudice is shown, the taxpayer must demon-
strate that the IRS violation was careless, reckless, or intentionals2 to 
recover. In cases where the IRS poses a bona fide challenge to the 
type of permissible recording media, even if its opposition is later de-
termined to be incorrect and a violation of the statute, no recovery 
could be obtained because the IRS did not act carelessly. Finally, 
courts will still need to determine the measure of damages. For exam-
ple, in the case of a prejudicial denial of the right to record, will the 
court abate the entire deficiency flowing from the audit or employ 
some other measure of damages, such as increased taxpayer costs? 
b. Proof problems: an illustration. One can better understand 
the shortcomings of the bill's right-to-record provision by applying the 
provision to a hypothetical set of facts. s3 Consider the following: 
A young farmer worked part-time to earn additional income. An 
IRS agent called him to arrange an audit. The farmer requested that 
the audit be tape-recorded. The agent denied the request. At the au-
dit, the agent determined that because the farmer was not in the full-
time business of farming for profit, the losses on his farm were to be 
denied. The agent told the farmer that he owed the Government 
$100,000, but would settle the case for $10,000. The agent added the 
threat that if the farmer refused to pay, the agent would promptly 
make a jeopar.dy assessment54 against the farmer, and would immedi-
ately begin seizing his assets for the full $100,000 liability. Fearing 
injury to his business and reputation, the farmer reluctantly assented 
to the agent's demands. The agent knew that the IRS position with 
respect to the farmer's taxes was legally incorrect, and knew that the 
farmer would rely on his statement. The agent also knew that the 
jeopardy assessment could not be made, because no deficiency notice 
and demand for payment had yet been made. ss Moreover, the agent 
knew that the farmer had no intention of transferring the assets to 
avoid payment of any tax. 
Assume that the agent's threat would constitute not only willful 
52. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. This is a problem whenever the bill's damages provision 
applies. 
53. This hypothetical is based on an actual factual situation presented in the Congressional 
Record. See 133 CONG. REc. 82563 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1987). Because this scenario constitutes 
mere fiction, it serves only to illustrate the application of the bill's right-to-record provision. 
54. l.R.C. § 6861 (1982). 
55. See note 93 infra. 
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oppression under color oflaw56 but also duress, 57 a ground for setting 
aside the settlement agreement. 58 In the hypothetical, the farmer sued 
to set aside the agreement on grounds of duress and violations of the 
Code. At trial, the agent denied ever threatening the jeopardy assess-
ment. The farmer testified to the contrary. The farmer introduced no 
evidence to impeach the agent's testimony. The district court con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish the farmer's 
claim and upheld the agreement. 
To be sure, the preceding scenario constitutes an injustice. But the 
ability to obtain damages for the IRS' careless, reckless, or intentional 
failure to permit recording of the audit will not translate into a recov-
ery of damages by the farmer. The farmer incurred at least $10,000 in 
damages. Having found that there was insufficient evidence of duress, 
the district court presents the farmer with a "catch-22": Because the 
recording was illegally denied, the farmer lost his case; and because 
the recording was illegally denied, the farmer cannot prove damages 
for the denial. This illustrates the need for injunctive relief or, in the 
alternative, an ability to set aside, with prejudice to the IRS, judg-
ments obtained pursuant to illegal audit procedures. Thus, a remedy 
in damages inadequately compensates the denial of the taxpayer's 
right to record an audit. 
In the actual case cited in the Congressional Record, 59 an IRS 
agent visited several farmers and attempted to exact settlements for 
sums far below amounts demanded through demands bordering on 
duress. Fortunately, the farmer in that case did not make the mistake 
of agreeing to the settlement. If Congress wishes to discourage abusive 
IRS conduct, it should create an enforceable right to record through 
injunctive remedies. This will provide incentives for IRS agents to 
conduct themselves politely at audits and, more importantly, will curb 
sharp tactics. 
3. Power of Attorney 
This section shows that the bill's power of attorney provision rem-
edies the problem that its drafters intended to address: overreaching 
by the IRS through unwarranted contact with taxpayers, in violation 
of validly executed powers of attorney. In this area, the bill safeguards 
56. I.R.C. § 7214(a)(l) (1982). 
57. See, e.g., Aircraft Assoc. & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 373 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Hal-
ton Tractor Co. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Cal. 1956), modified, 258 F.2d 612 (9th 
Cir. 1958). 
58. See, e.g., Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating in dicta 
that a settlement agreement is unenforceable when procured through mistake, undue influence, 
fraud or duress); Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (same); Duncan 
v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Ky. 1941). See also cases cited at note 57 supra. 
59. See note 53 supra. 
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taxpayer rights without jeopardizing the IRS' ability to make bona fide 
tax-related investigations. 
Section three of the bill provides that any person authorized to 
practice before the IRS may represent the taxpayer at an audit. 60 The 
bill compels the IRS to treat the representative as the taxpayer unless 
that representative causes "unreasonable delay or hindrance" to the 
audit effort. 61 While the Code is silent concerning taxpayer powers of 
attorney, treasury regulations allow the taxpayer to be represented at 
an IRS examination (audit) by an attorney, certified public accoun-
tant, enrolled actuary, or other certified representative.62 Thus, 
although the new provision creates a new right, in reality the provision 
only strengthens a right taxpayers already have. 
Though treasury regulations permit the use of powers of attorney, 
they do not explicitly prohibit the IRS from contacting the taxpayer 
directly even though the taxpayer has given a power of attorney to a 
qualified advisor. However, treasury regulations do permit the IRS to 
contact the taxpayer directly when the taxpayer's advisor has been un-
reasonable about furnishing nonprivileged information. 63 From this, 
one could infer that the taxpayer could not normally be contacted in 
contravention of the power of attorney. But the IRS declares that it 
may directly contact taxpayers whenever the taxpayer maintains infor-
mation needed by the agency.64 Indeed, the IRS believes that direct 
contact with taxpayers is critical to the effectiveness of their audit ef-
forts. 65 In addition, taxpayers may not assert that contact by the IRS 
is protected by the constitutional right to counsel, because civil tax 
investigations are of a factfinding, nonadjudicative nature. 66 
The codification of a valid power of attorney, coupled with the 
bill's damages provision, will assuredly enhance the taxpayer's posi-
tion because no present remedy exists for an IRS violation of a tax-
payer's power of attorney. Without injunctive remedies for these 
violations, however, the taxpayer again faces problems of proof in an 
action for damages. When the IRS violates a power of attorney, the 
taxpayer may lose an otherwise meritorious case because the IRS ob-
tained evidence or admissions from the unwitting taxpayer. This evi-
60. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
61. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 3. 
62. Treas. Reg. § 601.502(b) (as amended in 1984). 
63. Treas. Reg. § 601.505(b) (as amended in 1980). 
64. See note 68 infra and accompanying text. 
65. See id. 
66. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332 (1957); Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803 
(D.N.J. 1966), dismissing appeal from 377 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1967). See generally Sixteenth An-
nual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1985-
1986, 15 GEO. L.J. 713, 1029 (1987) (the sixth amendment right to counsel extends to criminal 
prosecutions resulting in imprisonment and "attaches at the formal initiation of adversacy judi-
cial proceedings"). 
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dence would not have been available had the IRS dealt solely with the 
more knowledgeable authorized representative. Barriers to taxpayer 
recovery will be compounded by the easily invoked defense that the 
authorized representative caused unreasonable delay or hindrance to 
the investigation. 
While the provision fails to provide a more explicit definition of 
unreasonable delay, it will ensure that taxpayers do not delay or dis-
rupt audits via the power of attorney, a critical consideration in a sys-
tem that conducts approximately 1.27 million examinations each 
year.67 Audit quality is a second consideration. Unless the power of 
attorney unreasonably delays or hinders the audit, the authorized rep-
resentative steps into the taxpayer's shoes. Even when the taxpayer is 
represented, the IRS believes that the taxpayer's presence at the audit 
and willingness to respond to questions are important to audit effec-
tiveness. 68 Thus, the bill may limit the IRS' ability to gather essential 
information within the taxpayer's peculiar knowledge. 69 But in many 
instances, particularly when the authorized representative closely ad-
vises the taxpayer, that representative may be in the best position to 
respond to IRS inquiries. Conceding that taxpayers possess vital, pe-
culiar knowledge, there is little to suggest that when this knowledge is 
needed it could not be obtained via communication between the au-
thorized representative and the taxpayer. Any logistical problems cre-
ated by the additional communication step between the taxpayer and 
the authorized representative (as opposed to direct taxpayer communi-
cation with the IRS) would be limited, because the bill proscribes un-
reasonable delay or hindrance of audits. Overall, the bill strikes a 
reasonable balance between respect for powers of attorney and hin-
drance of the IRS' ability to conduct audits. 
4. Taxpayer Surveillance 
This section will demonstrate that the provision of the bill prohib-
iting unrelated taxpayer surveillance is unnecessary. The bill dupli-
cates the rights already granted the taxpayer by the Privacy Act. This 
provision may also have a harmful effect not associated with the Pri-
vacy Act. Principally, the bill's criminal sanctions for these surveil-
lance actions will inhibit the gathering of information relevant to the 
collection of taxes. 
The bill prohibits officers or employees of the United States from 
authorizing, requiring, or conducting any investigation into or surveil-
lance of a taxpayer that is not relevant to the collection or determina-
67. See c. STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR COLLECTING TAXES? FINANCING THE IRS 
11 (1986) (figures exclude employment, excise, and windfall profit truces). 
68. Letter from Commissioner Lawrence Gibbs to Rep. J.J. Pickle (Nov. 4, 1986), reprinted 
in TAX NOTES, Nov. 24, 1986, at 714. 
69. See id. 
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tion of the taxpayer's tax Iiability.70 This section of the bill 
supplements l.R.C. section 7214, which provides for criminal penalties 
against the offending agent. The bill would amend that section to in-
clude a fine of up to $10,000 and/or five years imprisonment, as well 
as discharge of the offending government employee. Moreover, the 
offending employee must pay the taxpayer's damages stemming from 
the violation. 11 
This proposed amendment to section 7214 is unnecessary and du-
plicative. The Privacy Act, 72 which governs surveillance activities by 
federal agencies, already requires that an agency that maintains a sys-
tem of records maintain only those records necessary to accomplish its 
administrative purpose. The Privacy Act also forbids federal agencies 
from maintaining records describing an individual's exercise of first 
amendment rights unless those records relate to an authorized law en-
forcement activity.73 The intent of both the bill's provision and the 
Privacy Act are the same: to prohibit unnecessary surveillance of citi-
zens by federal agencies. Moreover, neither the bill's provisions nor 
the Privacy Act apply when the surveillance or investigation is ger-
mane to the collection or determination of the tax liability.74 Under 
the Privacy Act, there must be a direct nexus between the information 
gathered and a criminal, civil, or administrative law enforcement ac-
tivity. 75 Similarly, surveillance pertinent to the collection or determi-
nation of tax liability would be permitted under the bill. 
70. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 24. There is also an exception for certain organized crime 
activities. 
71. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 24; see also I.R.C. § 7214 (1982). I.R.C. § 7423 (1982) permits 
the Secretary to indemnify certain damages and costs recovered against an offending employee in 
the due performance of his official duties. Even if unauthorized surveillance was construed to fall 
within the scope of due performance of official duties, it would not protect the employee against 
criminal sanctions because § 7423 indemnifies only damages and costs. See S. 1774, supra note 9, 
§ 24. 
Compare I.R.C. § 7214 (1982) with I.R.C. § 7431 (1982). Section 743l(a)(l) permits suits 
against the government for its unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer and return information. It 
does not permit suit against the government employee who makes the unauthorized disclosure. 
Similarly, the Federal Tort Claims Act extends jurisdiction to sue the government, but not to sue 
the offending government employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1982). 
On its face, the bill's taxpayer surveillance provisions are designed to protect taxpayer pri· 
vacy. Thus, if these provisions should be adopted at all, they should appear as amendments to 
I.R.C. § 7431. The bill's taxpayer surveillance provisions and§ 7431 advance similar interests: 
the former circumscribes information that can be collected, the latter circumscribes the disclo· 
sure oflawfully collected information. Thus, the damages framework of§ 7431 would best fit the 
bill's surveillance provision. 
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(l) (1982) ("Each agency that maintains a system of records shall ••• 
maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to 
accomplish a purpose of the agency required ... by statute or by executive order ••.• "). 
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1982). 
74. See S. 1774, supra note 9, § 24; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(l) (1982). See also England v. Com· 
missioner, 798 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1986) (no Privacy Act liability exists where the records 
related solely to the determination of tax liability and were unrelated to the exercise of first 
amendment rights). 
75. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
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Duplication of Privacy Act provisions is of comparatively little 
harm. At worst, there will be a new body of law filling up unnecessary 
space in an already voluminous Code. However, the real danger of 
this provision is its potential to chill pertinent IRS information-gather-
ing because of the bill's criminal sanctions for collection or retention 
of such information. The opposing argument posits that I.R.C. sec-
tion 7214(a)76 already provides similar criminal sanctions. Despite the 
force of this argument, it fails to recognize that the bill's proposed 
amendment to section 7214(a) does not fit with the purposes of that 
section. Section 7214(a) deals with, among other things, corrupt prac-
tices by IRS employees. Many of these practices, such as bribery and 
extortion, are already state and federal crimes. The prevention of 
these corrupt practices goes to the very core of the public's confidence 
in the voluntary taxpayer compliance system. In contrast, the investi-
gation/surveillance sanctions of the bill criminalize behavior that may 
only slightly deviate from legitimate and good faith prosecution of tax 
violators. To attach criminal sanctions to such activities raises the 
very real potential for impairment of vigorous, good faith enforcement 
of the tax laws. 
In this respect, the Privacy Act provides a more intelligent ap-
proach to the problem of unwarranted government investigation and 
surveillance. Damages for such violations are assessed against the 
government, not the offending employee. 77 This lessens the possibility 
of impairment of good faith enforcement efforts. Therefore, the bill's 
taxpayer surveillance provisions have the dual effect of adding no 
meaningful protection to taxpayers, while severely hampering neces-
sary IRS investigations. 
B. Application of the Administrative Procedure Act 
As previously noted, the bill codifies certain provisions of both the 
76. I.R.C. § 7214(a) (1982) provides that 
Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of 
the United States - (1) who is guilty of any extortion or willful oppression under color of 
law; or (2) who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law, or 
receives any fee, compensation, or reward, except as by law prescribed, for the performance 
of any duty; or (3) who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails 
to perform any of the duties of his office of employment; or (4) who conspires or colludes 
with any other person to defraud the United States; or . . . (7) who makes or signs any 
fraudulent entry in any book, or makes or signs any fraudulent certificate, return or state-
ment; or (8) who, having knowledge or information of the violation of any revenue law by 
any person, or of fraud committed by any person against the United States under any reve-
nue law, fails to report, in writing, such knowledge or information to the Secretary; or (9) 
who demands, or accepts, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly as payment or gift, or 
otherwise, any sum of money or other thing of value for the compromise, adjustment, or 
settlement of any charge or complaint for any violation or alleged violation of law, except as 
expressly authorized by law so to do; shall be dismissed from office or discharged from 
employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than 5 years, or both. 
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1982). 
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Internal Revenue Manual and the treasury regulations. This section 
proves that the codifications of the Internal Revenue Manual afford 
greater legal protection to taxpayers, even without significant changes 
to the terms of the safeguards already provided in the Manual. The 
right to record taxpayer interviews, for example, and many other tax-
payer rights are governed by the Internal Revenue Manual. No stat-
ute, however, addresses whether the Internal Revenue Manual has the 
force of law.78 
It is, of course, settled law that regulations validly promulgated 
pursuant to notice and comment or on-the-record requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act have the force oflaw.79 It follows that 
an agency action which violates agency rules cannot stand.80 How-
ever, internal agency rules such as the Internal Revenue Manual are 
treated differently from regulations and statutes. And because section 
23 of the bill provides a damages remedy for an IRS violation of a 
pertinent statute or regulation, the bill's protection will not extend to 
violations of the Internal Revenue Manual. 81 
An agency is not required to follow an internal rule if it concerns 
the internal administration of the agency. 82 However, where individ-
ual rights are affected by agency deviation from established rule, the 
agency must follow that rule, even if it concerns only internal agency 
procedure. 83 In addition to affecting an individual's rights, detrimen-
tal reliance by the taxpayer upon the Internal Revenue Manual is a 
condition to recovery for violation of a Manual provision. 84 
In addition to protection against agency caprice, 85 codification of 
an internal rule in a statute eliminates the need for a taxpayer to 
demonstrate an adverse effect upon him and to demonstrate detrimen-
tal reliance upon the internal rule. The first problem, demonstration 
of an effect upon the taxpayer of the internal rule, is not particularly 
problematic. Typically, the deviation from the rule affects taxpayer 
rights, or the claim would never have been brought. 86 More difficult is 
the need to demonstrate detrimental reliance. Such a requirement 
78. Cf I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1982) (permitting the Secretary to give rule changes retroactive 
effect). 
79. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own 'Z.aws," 64 
TEXAS L. REv. l, 12 (1985). 
80. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 
1959). 
81. See S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 420-21 (10th Cir. 1971). 
83. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974). 
84. See Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1986). 
85. The IRS may change its rules and give them retroactive effect. See note 78 supra and 
accompanying text. 
86. Cf Raven-Hansen, supra note 79, at 18. 
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does not exist with a statute - its provisions apply regardless of 
whether or not the taxpayer shaped his affairs in reliance on them. In 
cases of unsophisticated or unrepresented taxpayers, the likelihood of 
detrimental reliance upon, for example, the Internal Revenue Manual 
seems slim. Thus, the bill's codification of Internal Revenue Manual 
provisions will give legal effect to the safeguards presently embodied 
by the Manual. Similarly, because the Administrative Procedure Act 
does not give the force of law to the Manual, the codifications of the 
Manual will provide greater substantive protection to taxpayers. 
III. IRS COLLECTIONS PROCEDURES 
A. Liens and Levies 
This section analyzes two problems the bill attempts to address. 
First, it analyzes the effectiveness of the bill's review provisions for 
premature levies, and concludes that the bill does not go far enough in 
providing the timely administrative or judicial review so critical to any 
workable premature levy safeguard. Indeed, present injunctive reme-
dies extend more protection against premature levies. Second, this 
section considers the protections afforded by the bill to innocent third 
parties who are wrongfully subjected to IRS liens or levies. It con-
cludes that these provisions will genuinely aid taxpayers, but that cer-
tain aspects of them will also hinder bona fide IRS collection efforts. 
1. Premature Levies 
One may infer that the bill's drafters believe that the present statu-
tory period between the time of notice and demand for payment of 
taxes and levy against the taxpayer's property is too short. 87 Accord-
ingly, the bill extends I.RC. section 633 l(a)'s88 ten-day period for no-
tice and demand prior to levy to thirty days. 89 With more advance 
warning, the taxpayer would be better able to respond in a timely fash-
ion to a request for payment. The bill also provides for a taxpayer 
review action when the IRS prematurely levies against the taxpayer. 
Under this provision, if the IRS levies against a taxpayer for the col-
lection of a deficiency less than thirty days after notice and demand for 
payment, the taxpayer may obtain administrative, and ultimately judi-
cial, review of the premature action under jeopardy assessment 
procedures. 90 
Premature levies are different from jeopardy assessments. Jeop-
87. This inference can be drawn because the bill extends l.R.C. § 633l(a)'s ten-day period for 
notice and demand for payment prior to levy to thirty days. See note 89 infra and accompanying 
text. 
88. I.R.C. § 633l(a) (1982) provides that a taxpayer who fails to pay taxes within ten days of 
notice and demand for payment by the IRS may be subjected to collection action by levy. 
89. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 14. 
90. See I.R.C. § 7429(b) (1982). 
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ardy assessments give the IRS special collection powers when there is 
reason to believe that the collection of tax is in jeopardy.91 Thus, 
I.R.C. section 7429(a) allows the taxpayer to argue the merits92 or 
challenge procedural defects93 of the jeopardy assessment.94 In the 
case of premature levy, however, there are few merits to examine -
the IRS has clearly deviated from a statutory timing standard and 
should be enjoined from collection, with no opportunity to show cause 
why its premature levy should go forward unless, of course, the IRS 
makes a jeopardy assessment. The ability to review a levy is useless to 
the taxpayer whose bank account or other assets are subjected to levy. 
In such a case, the taxpayer will want to stop the wrongful levy before 
the IRS takes his assets, rather than review the IRS action after such 
taking. 
Existing law provides taxpayers better safeguards against prema-
ture levies than the bill's provisions. The most obvious remedy under 
91. "If the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, ••• will be 
jeopardized by delay, he shall, •.• immediately assess such deficiency .... " I.R.C. § 686l(a) 
(1982). See also I.R.C. § 685l(a)(l) (1982), which provides: 
If the Secretary finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to depart from the United States or to 
remove his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any 
other act •.. tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially ineffectual proceedings to 
collect the income tax for the current or the immediately preceding taxable year ••• the 
Secretary shall immediately make a determination of tax ••• and notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, such tax shall become immediately due and payable. 
92. I.R.C. § 7429(g) (1982) requires that the Secretary prove the reasonableness of the assess· 
ment under the circumstances, while the taxpayer has the burden to prove the appropriateness of 
that assessment. Irreparable injury to the taxpayer will not, standing alone, sustain an injunction 
over an assessment. See, e.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 
(1962). In addition to irreparable hardship, the IRS action must plainly exceed the agency's 
statutory authority. An example of such an excess would be the use of a jeopardy assessment to 
exert pressure on the taxpayer for reasons unrelated to the collection of tax. See Sherman v. 
Nash, 488 F.2d 1081, 1084 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 582 
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969) (Notwithstanding I.R.C. § 742l(a)'s prohibition 
on taxpayer actions to enjoin the collection of any tax, an attempted jeopardy assessment over 
unpaid wagering taxes may be enjoined if (1) it is clear that under no circumstances could the 
Government prevail, and (2) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 
499 F.2d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1974), ajfd., 424 U.S. 614 (1976) (same); Lucia v. United States, 
474 F.2d 565, 575 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); Williams v. Wiseman, 333 F.2d 810, 811 (10th Cir. 
1964) (same). 
93. A jeopardy or termination assessment made without prior notice of deficiency to the 
taxpayer is illegal, and the taxpayer is entitled to release of any assets obtained by the IRS pursu-
ant to the procedurally defective IRS action. See Causey v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) 1J 9,161 (D. Minn. 1978) (citing Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976); Campbell v. 
United States, 532 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1976); L.O.C. Indus. v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 265 
(M.D. Tenn. 1976)). Courts may also set aside a levy pursuant to a jeopardy assessment if the 
IRS denies the taxpayer notice and opportunity to pay the assessment prior to the levy. L.O.C. 
Indus., 423 F. Supp. at 273. 
94. Administrative and judicial review of jeopardy assessments also extends to termination 
assessments. I.R.C. § 7429(a) (1982). "[L]egislative history ••. shows that Congress intended 'a 
taxpayer who has been subjected to a termination assessment to [be able to] contest the ultimate 
issue of his liability in the Tax Court in the same manner as is provided with respect to a tax· 
payer who has been subjected to a jeopardy assessment.'" Perlowin v. Sassi, 711 F.2d 910, 912 
(9th Cir. 1983) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 367, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2897, 3796). 
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existing law is for the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court for redeter-
mination of the deficiency, which will automatically enjoin collection 
action by the IRS.95 Beyond that, courts will void levies in circum-
stances where the IRS deviated from statutorily prescribed proce-
dures.96 Thus, if the IRS fails to provide notice and an opportunity to 
pay the amount assessed, the statute requires that any levy be en-
joined. 97 Given this, why would a taxpayer faced with a premature 
levy ever want to use the jeopardy review provisions of I.RC. section 
7429, which permit the levy when the Secretary can prove mere rea-
sonableness?98 The taxpayer is better served here by existing law. 
2. Lien and Levy Against an Innocent Third Party 
What will the bill do to cure the injustice . worked upon Ms. 
Lojeski?99 Recall that her property was levied upon or tied up by 
liens, and she claimed (but was not awarded) damages based upon 
those IRS actions. Lojeski was a third party who fell victim to the 
IRS' suspicion that the allegedly deficient taxpayer, Treadway, had 
been transferring assets to her. The following discussion concludes 
that the bill will provide a meaningful remedy to Lojeski (and to tax-
payers in general) for the liens that were wrongfully placed on her 
property. 
Under the Code, no suit may be maintained to restrain assessment 
or collection against an actual transferee of a taxpayer subject to a 
deficiency. 100 Additionally, no protection exists for the transferee 
under the Code's wrongful levy provisions.101 But in the case of an 
innocent third party, the Code provides for a wrongful levy action,102 
and in such actions the IRS carries the burden of proving that the levy 
was appropriate under the circumstances.103 
In Lojeski's case, the Code's wrongful levy provision had two 
shortcomings. First, the provision applies to levies, so Lojeski could 
95. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982) (unless a jeopardy or termination assessment has been made, 
no deficiency assessment or levy can be made until Tax Court decisions become final). Tread-
way's "horror story," recounted in the text accompanying notes 1-8 supra, is probably atypical 
because he was subjected to a jeopardy assessment, which is used only under special circum-
stances where collection is in doubt. In the typical case, the well-advised taxpayer need only 
petition the Tax Court to enjoin any collection action. 
96. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. ill. 1986). See also note 93 
supra. 
97. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982) provides that "the making of [a premature] assessment or .•• 
levy ••. may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court." ' 
98. See I.R.C. § 7429(g) (1982). See also note 93 supra. 
99. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra. 
100. I.R.C. § 742l(b)(l) (1982). 
101. See. e.g., Shannon v. United States, 521 F.2d 56, 59 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 965 (1976). 
102. I.R.C. § 7426 (1982). 
103. See Flores v. United States, 551 F.2d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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not obtain relief under the section for her farm, which was subject to a 
lien. Second, even if the wrongful levy provision applied, the Code 
makes no allowance for consequential damages, which were a compo-
nent of the damages claimed. Conceivably, the first problem could be 
solved by bringing an action to quiet title against the govemment. 104 
This action allows the aggrieved party to sue to remove government 
liens despite the Code's proscription on taxpayer suits to enjoin tax 
collections.105 However, an action to quiet title would still not provide 
for consequential damages.106 
Through its provision for recovery of actual damages for careless, 
reckless, or intentional violations of the Code, the bill should remedy 
the present unavailability of consequential damages to the taxpayer. 107 
In Lojeski's case, there is a strong likelihood that the IRS action 
would be characterized as careless, if not reckless, because there were 
no reasonable grounds to support the suspicion that Treadway was 
transferring assets to her. Thus, the bill addresses the IRS abuse illus-
trated in Lojeski's case with an adequate remedy in damages. 
From an IRS enforcement perspective, the damages provision also 
makes sense. If the IRS levies against a taxpayer whom the IRS rea-
sonably believes to be a transferee, no damages will be recoverable 
even if the IRS is wrong when viewed with hindsight. Because IRS 
tax liens would be challenged under a federal action to quiet title, 108 
the bill's damages provisions (which are limited to IRS violations of 
the Code) would not apply. However, negligent or knowing failure to 
release an IRS tax lien also triggers recovery of damages under a sepa-
rate provision of the bill. 109 The recovery of damages for negligent or 
knowing failure to release a lien is limited to circumstances where the 
liability has been satisfied, where the liability is unenforceable, (as 
where the statute of limitations has run) or where a bond has been 
accepted.110 A court determination that an IRS lien is wrongful is a 
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1982) provides, in pertinent part, that "the United States may be 
named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court, or in any State court having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter .•• to quiet title to ••. real or personal property on which the 
United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien." 
105. See United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1961). Innocent third parties 
like Lojeski use actions to quiet title to remove clouds on title without arguing the merits of the 
deficiency. 
106. See Ringer v. Basile, 645 F. Supp. 1517, 1526 (D. Colo. 1986) (court dismissed damages 
claim coupled with quiet title action because there was no waiver of sovereign immunity for 
money damages claims). Cf. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962) (a 
suit to enjoin the collection or assessment of tax may not be brought merely because collection 
would cause the taxpayer irreparable injury). See also Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742, 744 (5th 
Cir. 1957). 
107. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. 
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1982) and note 104 supra. 
109. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 22. 
110. See S. 1774, supra note 9, § 22. The bill applies only to actions to release a lien under 
I.R.C. § 6325 (1982). This Code section governs the release of IRS liens only when the liability 
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further determination that there is no tax liability. If there is no tax 
liability, the liability should be "satisfied." Thus the bill also extends 
relief to Lojeski for the liens wrongfully placed on her property. 
The bill also creates administrative review for liens. Under the bill, 
any person may administratively appeal when the IRS imposes a lien 
on their property.111 In contrast, actions to quiet title typically protect 
only innocent third parties.112 As applied to allegedly delinquent tax-
payers, the most likely interpretation of the provision will be to enable 
the taxpayer to challenge the basis for the deficiency.113 This is true 
because the Code automatically imposes a lien on all of the taxpayer's 
property once the IRS demands payment oftaxes.114 Because the tax-
payer may not normally challenge a tax lien, any challenge a taxpayer 
makes to a lien must be on the merits. In other words, the taxpayer 
must assert that he does not owe the tax. 
Administrative review of liens by taxpayers curiously extends a 
system that already provides for judicial and administrative review on 
the merits. This will enable any taxpayer to delay the imposition of a 
lien pending outcome on the merits. This delay will permit taxpayers 
fraudulently to transfer assets otherwise restrained by liens. In addi-
tion, administrative challenges to tax liens extend no needed additional 
rights to honest taxpayers. 115 Thus, the adoption of an administrative 
review provision for liens would be contrary to the intent of the bill's 
drafters: to remedy genuine abuses of taxpayers without hindering 
IRS enforcement efforts. 
B. Installment Payment of Income Tax Liabilities 
This section argues that the bill's income tax installment payment 
provisions substantially enhance taxpayer protection in an area pres-
ently susceptible to IRS abuse. Moreover, these provisions require few 
concessions by the IRS of its collection powers. Finally, the provi-
sions also comport with general notions of notice, fairness and due 
process. The analysis commences with a factual example of the prob-
is satisfied, the lien is unenforceable, or a bond is accepted for the liability. The Secretary may, at 
his discretion, also issue a certificate of discharge in selected circumstances. 
111. See S. 1774, supra note 9, § 15. 
112. The exreption to this axiom is "when a taxpayer refrains from contesting the merits of 
the underlying tax assessment .•.. " Aqua Bar & Lounge v. United States, 539 F.2d 935, 940 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
113. Section 15 of the bill provides that "Any person shall be allowed to appeal to the Secre-
tary, in such form and at such time as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulations, the imposition 
of a lien under this subchapter on the property or rights to property of such person." S. 1774, 
supra note 9, § 15. 
114. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). 
115. See Hearings on S. 604, supra note 23, at 86 (prepared statement of Robert M. Tobias, 
National President of the National Treasury Employees Union) (Delays are unwarranted be-
cause in 99% of the cases it is the taxpayer's admitted liability that is subject to collection. Thus, 
the bill will halt collection and cause the loss of billions in revenue.). 
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lem sought to be addressed, followed by a description of the bill's pro-
visions, and concludes with a discussion of the provisions' effect on 
taxpayer rights. 
The problem to be addressed by the bill's income tax installment 
payment provisions is well illustrated by the following factual 
situation: 
A small businessman entered into an installment agreement with the IRS 
for back taxes. The taxpayer made every payment on time. . . . One day 
his creditors began calling him to say that his business checks were 
bouncing. He then called his bank to find that the IRS had decided to 
cancel their agreement and had levied on his business account without 
contacting him. When he finally was able to get through to the IRS, 
they informed him that they had decided to collect because of the sub-
stantial change in the financial. condition of his business. Result of the 
IRS action: creditors called in their notes, many suppliers would only 
deal in cash after his checks bounced, and some suppliers refused to do 
business with him.116 
This "horror story" dramatizes the void the bill intends to fill: the 
absence of a statutory requirement that the IRS honor income tax in-
stallment agreements. Treasury regulations do not aid the taxpayer in 
this respect, as they all contain permissive language that allows the 
IRS to release a levy when the taxpayer makes satisfactory arrange-
ments with the IRS district director to pay in installments.117 But any 
release from levy by the IRS does not preclude a later levy, as the 
above example dramatizes. 118 The bill would enable the IRS to enter 
installment agreements for the payment of income taxes when it "de-
termines that such agreement will facilitate collection" of an income 
tax liability.119 If the IRS enters such an agreement, it is to be bind-
ing.120 However, if the financial condition of the taxpayer changes, 
the IRS may "alter, modify or annul" the installment agreement. 121 
To the extent that the IRS does not find a significant change in tax-
payer financial condition, the bill considerably enhances the certainty 
116. 133 CONG. REc. 82563 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1987); see also SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, 
supra note 19, at 10 ("Levies on checking accounts require no notice to the taxpayer, so that a 
taxpayer's first word of such a levy comes when its checks to creditors are returned as a result of 
the levy."). 
117. Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-l(a)(2)(v) (1972). The IRS has six options in handling cases 
requiring collection action: (1) require payment from available assets; (2) secure a short-term 
extension of time to pay or an installment agreement; (3) report the account currently uncollect-
ible; (4) recommend or initiate enforcement action; (5) file notice offederal tax lien; or (6) explain 
the Code's offer in compromise provisions to the taxpayer. 2 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 
1f 5323, at 6538-39 (May 15, 1986). 
118. See note 116 supra and accompanying text. See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-l(a)(l) 
(1972). Indeed, in some IRS districts, levies are not released at all, even when the taxpayer enters 
an installment agreement. See Hearings on S. 604, supra note 23, at 89 (statement of Robert M. 
Tobias, National President of the National Treasury Employees Union). 
119. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 12. 
120. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 12. 
121. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 12. 
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that the IRS will honor installment agreements entered into with 
taxpayers. 
This provision will also compel the IRS to enter installment agree-
ments only in cases where there is a strong likelihood that a greater 
percentage of the deficiency will be recovered if the taxpayer is allowed 
to pay by installments. There will no longer be cases in which the IRS 
has nothing to lose by entering an installment agreement and later 
levying at their whim. The provision is also fairer to taxpayers, given 
their perfectly valid expectation that parties honor agreements (or in-
cur liability when they breach such agreements and cause damages). 
More importantly, the new provision does much to prevent the IRS 
from unexpectedly levying at an inopportune moment with injurious 
or even catastrophic effects on the taxpayer. 
Allowing the IRS to disregard the installment agreement when 
there is a significant change in the taxpayer's financial condition first 
requires a definition of change in financial condition. 122 When finan-
cial conditions change for the worse, there will often be no assets 
against which a levy can be made. When financial conditions change 
for the better, the "IRS horror story" is bound to recur. One feature 
of the bill that will remove the harshness of the IRS' power to acceler-
ate collection of its installment debts is a requirement for a hearing on 
the record123 pursuant to procedures set out by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 124 The hardship incurred in the "IRS horror story" 
was not so much the inability to pay ~he remaining obligation in a 
lump-sum, but rather the lack of notice125 that the IRS planned to 
exercise its levy powers. Under the bill, IRS violations of the install-
122. This change could probably be determined using present IRS procedures governing the 
payment options discussed at note 117 supra. The taxpayer could set out pertinent financial 
information in a form similar to I.R.S. Form 433-A (Rev. Dec. 1986) (Collection Information 
Statement). See 2 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 11 5321(2), at 6537 (Aug. 20, 1986). Under 
the criteria set out in these forms, if the taxpayer's available cash equals or exceeds the tax 
liability, the IRS will demand immediate payment and will not enter an installment agreement. 
Id. 11 5323(3), at 6539. If the IRS enters an installment agreement, the taxpayer's monthly in-
stallments must usually equal or exceed the difference between the taxpayer's net income and 
IRS allowable expenses. Id. 11 5323(4)(e), at 6540. 
123. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 12. 
124. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982). 
125. Presently, the IRS installment agreement notifies the taxpayer that the entire tax liabil-
ity may be collected by levy and seizure if the taxpayer fails to meet the conditions of the agree-
ment or if collection of the taxes is endangered. See I.R.S. Forms 433-D (Rev. Dec. 1985) 
(Installment Agreement), 433-G (Rev. Aug. 1986) (Direct Debit Installment Agreement). Cf. 
I.R.S. Form 433-M (Rev. June 1980) (Installment Agreement) ("I understand that this agree-
ment will be withdrawn if ... the IRS determines that the entire amount of my tax should be 
collected."). Though the agreements notify the taxpayer that the IRS may either conditionally 
(as provided in I.R.S. Forms 433-D and 433-G supra) or unconditionally (as provided in I.R.S. 
Form 433-M supra) levy against property notwithstanding the installment agreement, these ac-
tions may surprise the taxpayer. There is no statutory requirement of notice and opportunity to 
be heard in these circumstances. It is also co=onplace IRS practice to refuse ever to release 
levies, even when the taxpayer enters an installment agreement. See note 118 supra. Accord-
ingly, surprise levies are performed, often with injurious consequences to the taxpayer. 
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ment payment provision would trigger the bill's damages remedy, so 
long as the IRS had carelessly, recklessly, or intentionally failed to 
observe the provision.126 Damages would chiefly arise in two circum-
stances: (1) failure to provide notice and a hearing, or (2) levying after 
determination that there has not been a significant change in financial 
condition of the ~payer. 
The bill's installment payment provision also allows the IRS to 
protect its interest when there is a significant change in the taxpayer's 
financial condition. There are two basic reasons for this. First, thirty 
days is a relatively short time to await the adjudication of the IRS' 
claim, and in most cases, barring fraudulent asset transfers, the tax-
payer's financial condition will not change dramatically during that 
period. Second, the IRS would still have available its arsenal of emer-
gency collection powers such as jeopardy assessments. In jeopardy as-
sessments, for example, the IRS may make immediate notice and 
demand for payment when it believes that the collection of a deficiency 
will be jeopardized by delay. 127 Therefore, the bill's installment pay-
ment provision does much to remedy needless IRS abuses, while re-
serving IRS powers to collect a~sets quickly when that type of action is 
truly needed. 
C. Uneconomical Levies 
This section evaluates a somewhat novel concept - uneconomical 
levies. 128 It starts by describing uneconomical levies and then provides 
a set of facts to which the uneconomical levy provision was intended 
to apply. It concludes that the uneconomical levy provision does not, 
in many instances, address the problem to which it was directed. Fi-
nally, this section critiques the uneconomical levy provision and posits 
a more effective way to address the problem. 
When expenses incurred by the IRS in conducting a levy and sale 
of property exceeds the fair market value of the property sold or ex-
ceeds the underlying tax liability, the bill prohibits IRS levy. 129 The 
following scenario illustrates the reasons for this provision: Rose 
Mary Guzman, a single mother of six, dutifully made mortgage pay-
ments on a house titled in her brother's name. She believed all along 
that the house belonged to her, pursuant to a handwritten and unre-
corded agreement in Spanish. Her brother owed $4,794.96 to the U.S. 
government, and the house, valued at $45,000, was sold by the IRS for 
126. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. 
127. See I.R.C. § 686l(a) (1982); see also notes 2, 91 & 95 supra. 
128. The Uniform Commercial Code (u.C.C.) requires that a secured creditor sell collateral 
by commercially reasonable methods. See note 133 infra. However, the U.C.C. has no analo-
gous provision to the bill's uneconomical levy requirements, described in note 129 infra and 
accompanying text. 
129. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 13. 
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$6,200 to satisfy the delinquency.130 
By supplementing existing remedies for wrongful levy, 131 the bill 
adds to the array of taxpayer rights in this area by prohibiting these 
uneconomical levies. Ironically, however, neither Ms. Guzman nor 
her brother would obtain relief under the bill's uneconomical levy pro-
visions. Assuming the IRS sold the property for the amount of the 
deficiency plus costs to the IRS, those costs would total no more than 
$1,405.04.132 Because those costs neither exceed the tax liability nor 
the fair market value of the property, the bill would not preclude the 
sale, even though it seems wasteful to sell a $45,000 property for 
$6,200. 
Thus, a provision for sale of property subject to tax lien foreclosure 
·at fair market value or under commercially reasonable methods, with 
recovery of surplus proceeds by the judgment debtor, would better ad-
dress this problem.133 Under such a provision, when liens of relatively 
small value in relation to the property value are attached to the prop-
erty, the potential for the loss of the taxpayer's equity is eliminated. 
Unfortunately, the bill lacks these requirements. While the present 
Code furnishes time, place, and manner guidelines for sales of seized 
property, 134 it is far from settled whether those sales must be commer-
cially reasonable. 135 Even conceding that there is a commercial rea-
sonableness requirement, remedies for its breach are unclear. 
130. Curry, IRS Seizes, Sells Home of Mother of 6; San Antonio Sunday Express News, May 
24, 1987, at 2-C, col. 1. 
131. I.RC.§ 7426 (1982) provides relief from an IRS levy for parties other than the taxpayer 
by (1) ensuring recovery of sale proceeds to which the party claiming an interest in the property 
is entitled, by (2) allowing an injunction of levy, and by (3) providing for recovery of property. 
Ms. Guzman could have asserted that she held title to the property pursuant to the agreement 
with her brother, or asserted adverse possession under Texas law. See TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 16.026(a) (Vernon 1986). 
132. The $6,200 sale price less the $4,794.96 deficiency equals $1,405.04. This figure of 
$1,405.04 represents an inference from the given facts. Actual costs may have deviated from this 
figure. 
133. Ms. Guzman's "horror story" illustrates that IRS tax sales are often conducted to pro-
mote only the interests of the government and not those of the taxpayer. As between private 
parties, a sale of property to satisfy a security interest on a defaulted debt requires that the 
interests of the judgment debtor be considered. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977) (requiring sale of 
collateral by commercially reasonable methods). Of course, the best relief available to Ms. Guz-
man would be an action for wrongful levy under I.RC. § 7426. See note 131 supra. 
134. I.RC. § 6335 (1982). 
135. See M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 'if 14.17[2] (Supp. 1986) (indicat-
ing that issue of whether IRS must sell property in commercially reasonable fashion is unsettled). 
See also Ringer v. Basile, 645 F. Supp. 1517, 1521 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding that the IRS does not 
have unfettered discretion to sell property at any value where the property's fair market value 
greatly exceeds its sale price). Where property is sold pursuant to judicial order, few price objec-
tions may be interposed. In this context, a judicial sale will not be set aside for inadequacy of 
price unless the disparity between price and fair market value is so gross as to shock the con-
science of the court and the selling circumstances indicate unfairness, such as chilled bidding. 
See, e.g., Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 172 F.2d 416, 424 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949). 
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If Ms. Guzman's case is typical, the IRS does not sell seized prop-
erty in a commercially reasonable manner. The agency's own internal 
procedures support the view that property sales should promote IRS 
interests, with only consequential benefit to the taxpayer.136 Sales pur-
suant to I.R.C. section 6335 require the use of property valuation 
fioors137 and minimum bid prices.138 While ostensibly protecting tax-
payers, the IRS' chief concern is to collect money owed: the minimum 
bid price for properties sold may not exceed the tax liability plus ex-
penses of sale.139 This explains why Ms. Guzman's $45,000 house 
could be sold for $6,200. 
A different problem with the bill's uneconomical levy provision 
concerns its prohibition of levies that make economic sense. For ex-
ample, if the expenses of a sale of property subject to levy exceed the 
liability for which such levy is made, 140 the bill prohibits such levy. A 
levy under such circumstances is not necessarily uneconomical, how-
ever. Rather, an uneconomical levy is one in which the expense of 
levy exceeds the amount collected. Any incremental collections above 
the cost of levy would be an economical levy and therefore the bill's 
uneconomical levy provisions do not promote the most economically 
efficient (nor necessarily the fairest) collection policy. Having identi-
fied the problems with the bill's uneconomical levy provision, this 
Note now turns to an evaluation of the bill's damages provision. 
IV. DAMAGES PROVISION 
Does a taxpayer's right to obtain damages for the IRS' careless, 
reckless or intentional disregard for Code provisions141 create more 
problems than it solves? This Part shows that the right to obtain dam-
ages takes an important step toward genuine reform, without signifi-
cant disadvantages. This answer suggests an analysis of the 
considerations surrounding existing Code safeguards for taxpayers and 
the availability and scope of damages to aggrieved taxpayers under the 
bill. Because they pose the most serious potential for taxpayer injury 
136. Cf Treas. Reg. § 301.7506-l(b)(4) (as amended in 1974) (taxpayer property adminis-
tered by the United States pursuant to I.R.C. § 7506 permits the revenue officer to withdraw 
property from sale when to adjourn the sale would best serve the interests of the United States). 
See also 2 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) ff 56(17)5.22, at 6905 (Nov. 15, 1985). 
137. The forced sale value must equal at least 75% of the property's value. See 2 Internal 
Revenue Manual (CCH) ff 56(13)5.1, at 6866 (Jan. 15, 1987). 
138. The minimum bid price normally equals at least 80% of the property's forced sale value 
less encumbrances. Id. ff 56(13)5.1, at 6866 (Jan. 15, 1987). But see text accompanying note 139 
infra. 
139. Id. ff 56(13)5.1, at 6866 (Jan. 15, 1987). 
140. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 13. 
141. See S. 1774, supra note 9, §§ 22-23 (providing such recovery). A condition to recovery 
under this provision is an administrative determination in favor of the taxpayer. Id. 
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and are arguably of greatest concern to congressional reformers, 142 the 
following analysis confines itself to IRS collections. 
A. Existing Remedies 
In the majority of cases, the taxpayer can enjoin collection action 
pending final determination of tax liability by petitioning the Tax 
Court. 143 It follows that most abuses of the collections process should 
occur only with jeopardy and termination assessments and wrongful 
liens and levies.144 This is because the taxpayer cannot unilaterally 
control the imposition of jeopardy or termination assessments.145 
Wrongful liens and levies require the taxpayer to show that the IRS 
has no interest in his property. In contrast, a Tax Court petition en-
joins collection, pending adjudication of the tax assessment, regardless 
of the strength of the taxpayer's substantive position. 
In Treadway's case, 146 the administrative appeals process failed, 
even though Treadway ultimately won. 147 It failed because delays in-
herent in the process, coupled with the gravity of the IRS action, 
posed an insurmountable :financial burden to Treadway. Thus, under 
current law, when the IRS wrongfully makes a jeopa_rdy or termina-
tion assessment, injuries associated with the delays from administra-
tive and judicial review (such as destruction of a business interest) are 
uncompensated. 
1. Jeopardy and Termination Assessments 
One avenue to relief from jeopardy and termination assessments is 
for the taxpayer to post a bond in the amount of the alleged liabil-
ity.14s This bond will stay the assessment.149 In this context, however, 
a bond may usually be obtained only when the taxpayer has assets of 
value that substantially exceed the assessment amount. Moreover, 
bonding companies usually require cash collateral or its equivalent of 
value equal to the bond. 150 Bonds are no panacea, as they seriously 
142. Senator Pryor claims that most cases of severe taxpayer abuse occur in the collections 
process. See Hearings on S. 604, supra note 23, at 2 (statement of Sen. Pryor). 
143. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1982). 
144. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. 
147. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
148. I.R.C. § 6863 (1982) allows for a stay of all or part of the collection of a jeopardy or 
termination assessment when the taxpayer obtains a bond in the amount of the stay desired. 
149. See id. 
150. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 135, lJ 10.05[5][a]. Telephone conversations with national 
surety brokers and underwriters reveal a hesitancy to take even cash collateral. Many underwrit-
ers insist on irrevocable letters of credit. Irrevocable letters of credit are preferred because, un-
like cash or money market instruments, they are easy to safekeep, are negotiable sight drafts, and 
are not subject to avoidance as preferential distributions in bankruptcy. Telephone conversations 
with Detroit and Ann Arbor, Michigan banks reveal that if they agreed to issue irrevocable 
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impair a taxpayer's working capital. Because of their cash collateral 
requirements, bonds are no better than payment of the assessment and 
suit for refund. 
Concerning pre-levy rights, the fourth amendment forbids war-
rantless, nonpermissive entry by the IRS onto the taxpayer's property 
to take assets in satisfaction of tax liabilities.151 But nothing suggests 
that the IRS has difficulty obtaining writs of entry (warrants). In ad-
dition, once property has been taken by the IRS, there are few realistic 
remedies available to taxpayers subject to these actions. Post-seizure 
rights do include staying the sale of seized property in many circum-
stances.152 Sale may be stayed for the period during which the IRS 
would normally be precluded from levy or seizure if no jeopardy /ter-
mination assessment applied.153 For business, or even investment 
properties, however, a stay of sale is of little solace where the taxpayer 
needs the property and cannot easily find substitutes or replacements. 
2. Wrongful Liens and Levies 
Currently, the Code affords greater protection against IRS wrong-
ful liens and levies to innocent third parties than to taxpayers. For 
example, where irreparable injury looms from wrongful levy, the Code 
extends a rare injunctive remedy to third parties. 154 Further, the Code 
protects against irreparable harm in this context because it allows the 
third party who has been subjected to wrongful levy to recover his 
property.155 Unique and irreplaceable property thus seem well pro-
tected. Remedies for improper liens, however, are more problematic, 
even for innocent third parties. The IRS must remove a wrongful lien 
within 30 days of judicial determination of no liability, 156 but the tax-
payer may not recover damages if the IRS takes longer. 
3. Injury to Reputation and Credit 
Judicial hostility to consequential damages in wrongful lien and 
letters of credit in these circumstances, the banks would require the taxpayer to post cash collat· 
era! or its equivalent. (Cash equivalents are money market instruments such as Treasury Bills or 
bank certificates of deposit.) When a taxpayer is subject to a jeopardy assessment, however, it 
will be difficult to obtain a bond. When a bond is available, the taxpayer will ultimately be 
required to pledge cash collateral or its equivalent. Sources of the above information obtained by 
telephone are on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
151. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States. 429 U.S. 338 (1977). 
152. In this context, a seizure is the taking of property by the IRS from the taxpayer. A levy 
is the taking of taxpayer's property held by a third party. See M. SALTZMAN, supra note 135, 
1] 14.15. These terms do not necessarily have the same meaning they would have in civil litiga-
tion between private parties. 
153. See I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3) (1982). 
154. I.R.C. § 7426 (1982). 
155. I.R.C. § 7426(b)(2) (1982). 
156. See I.R.C. § 6325(a) (1982). 
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levy actions, 157 as well as the belief that such damages are too specula-
tive, have fostered disregard for an important interest: reputation and 
credit. Many small businesses with a few large customers fear that 
they will be perceived as incompetent, insolvent, or even dishonest 
when a wrongful IRS action mars their credit record.15s Indeed, 
Treadway's greatest complaint about his nightmare concerned the in-
jury to his credit.159 Unfortunately, the Code provides no remedy for 
this wrong. In addition, courts will deny recovery to taxpayers sub-
jected to the common law torts of harassment, defamation, interfer-
ence with business relationships, trespass, and mental suffering when 
the IRS agent acted within the scope of his authority.160 These courts 
hesitate to find that even the most egregious IRS wrongs were done 
outside the IRS agent's scope of authority.161 Occasionally, the judici-
ary will strain to provide recovery to injured taxpayers under the 
Code's limited damages provisions.162 But more often, the taxpayer is 
157. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9574 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(citing w. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 262-3 (3d ed. 1972)) (I.R.C. § 7426 provides no remedy 
for consequential or special damages stemming from the IRS' retention of property, or even for 
its diminution in value resulting from IRS negligence while in their custody). 
158. SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 19, at lO;see also note 116supra and accompany-
ing text. 
159. 700 Club: Taxpayer Rights and IRS Internal Affairs (WDCA television broadcast, Oct. 
16, 1987) (transcript of interview of Thomas Treadway by Cynthia Glaser, Christian Broadcast-
ing Network on file with the Michigan Law Review) ("I've been stripped of my reputation, but 
most of all, I've been stripped of my credit, because without credit ..• you can't function."). 
160. See. e.g., Keese v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 85, 93 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
161. See Keese, 632 F. Supp. at 93 ("a federal official is immune from suits under state tort 
law for acts within the scope of his discretionary duties authorized by law, even if the official 
acted out of malice or was deliberately misusing his authority"). See also United States v. Mitch-
ell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (unless it consents to be sued, the United States is immune from 
suit); Williamson v. United States Dept. of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1987) (claim for 
actions made in an official government capacity barred by sovereign immunity); American Assn. 
of Commodity Traders v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 598 F.2d 1233, 1235 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(sovereign immunity not waived merely because IRS agents may be personally liable in Bivens 
action). 
162. See Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding IRS liable under 
§ 6103 for actual damages caused by a wrongful bank account levy where the IRS action consti-
tuted a violation of disclosure limitations on taxpayer information). The Rorex court awarded 
damages for the violation ofl.R.C. § 6103 (1982) under I.R.C. § 7217 (1982). Section 7217 has 
since been repealed and superseded by l.R.C. § 7431 (1982), which provides like remedies against 
the Government, rather than the offending IRS employee. Compare Rorex with Timmerman v. 
Swenson, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-5727 to -5731 (D. Minn. 1979), where the court held that a 
levy against assets not belonging to a delinquent taxpayer resulting in disclosure of the taxpayer's 
delinquency to third parties violated no duty to the taxpayer. The Rorex court distinguished 
Timmerman on the basis that the taxpayers in Rorex had made timely installment payments of 
taxes, while the Timmerman taxpayers were delinquent. Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386. Timmerman 
did not rest on this distinction, however. Rather, Timmerman properly held that even when the 
IRS violates an Internal Revenue Manual provision that would clearly obviate its challenged 
action, the violation confers no right of recovery on the taxpayer. Timmerman, 44 A.F. T.R.2d 
(P-H) 1179-5731. See also notes 82-84supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the IRS has no 
duty to honor the type of installment agreement it entered into in Rorex. See note 125 supra. No 
remedies exist for the breach of a nonexistent duty. 
Even if there was a duty not to levy against a taxpayer who is current in his installment 
payments, Rorex was wrongly decided. I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1982) authorizes the disclosure of 
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without a remedy.163 This compensatory void leads one to wonder 
whether the bill will do better. 
B. The Bill's Remedies 
The bill's language providing damages for failure to release liens164 
and providing damages for unreasonable IRS actions165 bears consid-
erable similarity to the language contained in I.R.C. section 743l(c)166 
(the section containing sanctions for wrongful disclosures of taxpayer 
information), and the Privacy Act.167 All those provisions refer to 
"actual damages."16s The phrase "actual damages" is employed in 
many federal statutes, 169 but there is no plain meaning of "actual dam-
ages" at common law or elsewhere.170 Thus, the meaning and prob-
taxpayer information relating to the type of collection activity undertaken in Rorex, according to 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. Those regulations expansively define 
the circumstances in which return information of the type disclosed in Rorex may be publicized. 
Treasury Regulation§ 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(6) authorizes the disclosure ofreturn information "to 
locate assets in which the taxpayer has an interest [or] to ascertain the amount of any liabil· 
ity ••.• " Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(6) (1980). In this setting, the Code defines return 
information to include, among other things, the nature, source, or amount of the taxpayer's tax 
liabilities and deficiencies "or any other data received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, 
or collected by the Secretary with respect to ••• the determination of the existence, or possible 
existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person •••. " I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
The treasury regulations require only that no other means to accomplish the collection function 
exist. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(7) (1980). Thus, the Rorex holding not only lacks 
legal authority, but it places an unwarranted judicial gloss on the regulations: namely, that re-
turn information may be disclosed pursuant to a levy only when it comports with internal IRS 
policy. This gloss is especially unwarranted on a legislative regulation like the one involved, 
since I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1982) explicitly grants the Secretary authority to make regulations. 
163. See, e.g., Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (a viola-
tion ofl.R.C. § 7431 did not occur where the IRS agent made a good faith, reasonable effort to 
inform the taxpayer of a deficiency and contemplated collection action, even though taxpayer 
had paid the tax prior to the collection action). 
Another problem with recovery for wrongful disclosure involves the theory's narrow scope. 
The IRS can wrongfully collect many assets without disclosure to anyone, leaving the taxpayer 
without any conceivable remedy. 
164. "[U]pon a finding of liability on the part of the defendant, the defendant shall be liable 
••. [for] actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of actions of the defendant, or $100 
per day for each day the failure occurred, whichever is greater .... " S. 1774, supra note 9, § 22. 
165. "[A]ctual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of actions of the defendant, •••• " 
S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. 
166. "[T]he defendant shall be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum of- (1) 
the greater of - (A) $1,000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure ... or (B) the sum of - (i) 
the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of such unauthorized disclosure, plus (ii) 
in the case of a willful disclosure or a disclosure which is the result of gross negligence, punitive 
damages, plus (2) the costs of the action." I.R.C. § 743l(c) (1982). 
167. "[T]he United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of 
•.. actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case 
shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) 
(1982). 
168. See notes 164-67 supra. 
169. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (the Clayton Act); 7 U.S.C. § 25(a), (b) (1982) (the 
Commodity Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 168l(n) (1982) (the Fair Credit Reporting Act); 15 
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
170. Johnson v. I.R.S., 700 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1983) (upon review of authorities cited by 
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able application of "actual damages" must be derived from the bill's 
purposes and its relationship with other Code provisions. In addition, 
it is appropriate to analyze this ambiguous language in light of its us-
age in other, analogous federal statutes.171 In large part, the bill's ef-
fectiveness will be determined by judicial construction of this 
language. 
As noted, the bill's chief purpose is to stop the perceived abuse of 
taxpayers. 172 An interpretation of "actual damages" providing for re-
covery of consequential damages, 173 including injury to reputation and 
credit, lost profits, and incidental expenses, best serves that purpose. 
If the Code's present remedies, which protect restitutionary inter-
ests, 174 abate wrongful IRS actions, 175 and provide limited recoveries 
of costs, 176 adequately protected taxpayer interests such as reputation 
and credit and business profits, there would be far less need for a bill 
protecting taxpayers' rights. 
An expansive construction of "actual damages" can also be sup-
ported by the congressional desire to reform IRS practices. Ulti-
mately, the IRS must internalize its costs.177 By imposing additional 
parties, court concluded that there is no plain meaning or consistent judicial interpretation of 
"actual damages"). 
171. See Note, Damages Under the Privacy Act of 1974: Compensation and Dete"ence, 52 
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 629 (1984). 
172. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. See also Hearings on S. 604, supra note 23, at 
3 (''The Taxpayers' Bill of Rights is intended to put a stop to taxpayer abuse, .... "). 
173. Many of the wrongs sanctioned by the bill would be deemed tortious. For example, 
serious interference with a taxpayer's control over a chattel, such as where the IRS dispossesses 
the taxpayer of personal property, would constitute conversion. See REs'TATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 222A(l), 223 (1965). Similarly, these actions would constitute trespass to chattels. 
See id. §§ 217, 218. Further, liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be found 
through outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly directed at the victim. See id. § 46. The 
abuse of a position of authority can represent this sort of outrageous behavior. See id. § 46 
comment e. Communications, such as those that would injure a taxpayer's credit record, are 
defamatory. See id. § 559. Additionally, a corporation may recover for defamation if the defam-
atory communication prejudices the company in the conduct of its business or deters others from 
dealing with it. See id. § 561(a). 
Tort awards include consequential damages. See id. § 917 comment d (1977), which 
provides: 
although a contracting party who breaks his contract in failing to supply a machine would 
not be liable for the damages occasioned by the shutting down of a plant in which the 
machine was a necessary unit unless at the time of making the contract he knew or should 
have known the facts •.. , one who negligently destroys the machine may be responsible for 
the ensuing loss although he had no reason to know in advance of the machine's importance. 
174. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7426(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1982). 
175. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7429 (1982). 
176. I.R.C. § 7430 (1982). 
177. See Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 13 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) (When an individual bears the full benefits and costs of his precaution, that 
cost is internalized. Internalization means that the individual sweeps all of the values affected by 
his actions into his self-interest. Social efficiency is achieved by balancing these costs and bene-
fits.). Of course, internalization rests on the assumption that the Government behaves rationally: 
that is, it will not invade a protected interest if the cost of doing so exceeds the benefits derived 
from the invasion. See Note, supra note 171, at 631 n.122. However, some evidence indicates 
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costs for Code violations, the agency has an incentive to curb abuses. 
For instance, these added costs may cause the Collection Division to 
jettison the practice of evaluating employee performance based on levy 
and seizure activity, 178 and to start emphasizing large dollar, low risk 
collections. Similarly, expansive construction of "actual damages" 
will encourage taxpayer enforcement of the Code.179 Finally, "actual 
damages" should be broadly construed to meet the statute's remedial 
purpose, 180 because the most legitimate interpretation of a statute is 
the one that best furthers the legislative purpose.181 
Existing federal statutes also illuminate the possible meaning of 
"actual damages," and further clarify the scope of damages provided 
by this language. Courts interpreting the Privacy Act are split on 
whether or not "actual damages" go beyond out-of-pocket losses. 182 
The decisions that embrace a narrow construction do so out of fear of 
excessive government liability and the concomitant flurry of litiga-
tion.183 This concern, however, is unwarranted in this instance. To 
limit any litigation explosion against the government, the bill's draft-
ers added a provision for government recovery of damages for ground-
less taxpayer claims.184 This provision, along with the other 
considerations mentioned above, strongly suggests that the damages 
provision be adopted and broadly construed. 
that the IRS Collection Division does not act rationally. Because of organizational pressures or 
other factors, the Division exalts those activities that prove most injurious to taxpayers and least 
effective in terms of revenues collected. See note 33 supra. Nevertheless, the imposition of costs 
may be the incentive the IRS needs to change its policies. 
178. See note 33 supra. 
179. See Note, supra note 171, at 622 (inadequate recoveries resulting from restrictive inter-
pretation of "actual damages" will diminish incentives for citizen enforcement of the Privacy 
Act). 
180. But see Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, SOU. 
CHI. L. REV. 800, 808-09 (1983) (to construe remedial statutes broadly is to ignore legislative 
compromise). Because legislative compromise was probably not the motive for the use of this 
language, Posner's criticism of the canon that remedial statutes are to be broadly construed 
should not apply here. The bill's damages provision applies to every conceivable Code violation 
by the IRS. Thus, a more plausible reason for the ambiguous language is that neither Congress 
nor anybody else can envision all the potential applications of an omnibus remedial provision 
that governs all careless, reckless, or intentional Code violations. 
181. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); United States 
v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 276 F.2d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 
(1960). See also Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretatio11, 
46 U. PfIT. L. REV. 373, 398-99 (1985). 
182. Compare Johnson v. l.R.S., 700 F.2d 971, 972 (5th Cir. 1983) ("actual damages" in-
clude emotional injuries), with Albright v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.D.C. 1982), 
ajfd., 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("actual damages" require a showing of out-of-pocket loss). 
183. See, e.g., Pope v. Bond, 641 F. Supp. 489, 501 (D.D.C. 1986). 
184. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. See also 133 CONG. REC. Sl3,899 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) 
("Damages suits would be subject to frivolous claims penalties."). The federal judiciary is fur-
ther empowered to sanction frivolous claims using FED. R. C1v. P. 11. See Brownie v. United 
States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9334 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The bill's proposed reforms concerning taxpayer audits range from 
benign, duplicative modifications of the existing Code, to provisions 
that could disrupt the audit process, to codifications of the Internal 
Revenue Manual. The codifications, by eliminating the taxpayer's 
need to demonstrate detrimental reliance on the Internal Revenue 
Manual, will expand the safeguards already included in the Manual. 
Moreover, the permanence of these safeguards would be assured to a 
greater extent than before because the Manual's purpose is to govern 
IRS internal procedure, and it is subject to change at the whim of that 
agency. Finally, concerning taxpayer surveillance, the Privacy Act 
provides safeguards equivalent to those proposed by the bill without 
chilling enforcement. 
The bill attempts to curb abuse of the IRS collections process and 
- to the extent that greater time is afforded a taxpayer to respond to 
the threat of levy - the bill serves that end. However, remedies 
against premature, abusive, and uneconomical levies are impractical or 
simply ineffective, and will not extend greater protection to taxpayers 
than existing law. 
It seems fair to require the IRS to honor income tax installment 
payment agreements. This requirement also makes economic sense 
because it discourages destructive surprise levy tactics. Moreover, the 
bill reserves sufficient collection flexibility for the IRS while eliminat-
ing the unfairness that has characterized the installment payment 
process. 
The most potent safeguard against taxpayer abuse is the provision 
for recovery of damages for careless, reckless, or intentional Code vio-
lations by the IRS. This provision, however, may not aid taxpayers 
injured by mistakes of fact, or mistakes of fact and law. Whether the 
bill expands existing compensation to make injured taxpayers com-
pletely whole depends largely upon judicial interpretation of "actual 
damages." 
With improved drafting and heightened cognizance of existing law, 
Congress could go further in providing the safeguards envisioned by 
the bill without substantially interfering with the tax collection ma-
chinery. However, like most other legislation, the bill is a product of 
Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (a court may award attorney's fees when a litigant 
acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons") (quoting Vaughan v. Atkin-
son, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)). Another of the bill's barriers to taxpayer recovery is denial of dam-
ages when the taxpayer is contributorily negligent. S. 1774, supra note 9, § 23. The usage of this 
provision, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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compromise185 and the political aims of its drafters. 186 As such, four 
suggestions are posited. First, taxpayers should not be permitted to 
discontinue audits whenever they wish to seek counsel, and the provi-
sion permitting this should be deleted. Second, IRS agents should not 
be held criminally liable for surveillance of taxpayers, and the provi-
sion establishing this liability should be deleted. Third, the bill's 
prohibitions on uneconomical levies should be modified to contem-
plate the sale of seized property in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Finally, if possible, Congress should define what it means by "actual 
damages" in order to ensure full effect to the bill's compensatory 
mechanism for IRS Code violations. Additionally, the courts should 
liberally construe any damages provision so as to advance the bill's 
remedial purpose. By adopting these revisions, Congress could pre-
serve or even improve effective tax law administration, while continu-
ing the legislative trend toward taxpayer compensation.187 
- Creighton R. Meland, Jr. * 
185. See S. 604 §§ 2, 16, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Among other things, S. 604 required 
the IRS to provide Miranda warnings to taxpayers in civil audits and shifted the burden of proof 
in litigation with the IRS to that agency. These controversial provisions, in the face of criticism 
by interested groups, have been deleted from the present version of the bill. See, e.g., TAX DlVl· 
SlON OF THE AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, COMMENTS ON S. 579 TAX· 
PAYER'S [SIC] BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ANDS. 604 OMNIBUS TAXPAYER'S [SIC] BILL OP RIGHTS 
ACT 1, 4-5 (July 22, 1987) (submitted to the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Private Retire· 
ment Plans and Oversight of the IRS) (Miranda warnings would create "a 'criminal' atmosphere 
[and] would only frighten taxpayers and cause ill feelings toward the Service." Placing the bur· 
den of proof on the IRS would be an "extreme burden on the [tax collection] system .••• "). Even 
ardent supporters of S. 604, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, wondered aloud 
about the political viability of the proposal to shift the burden of proof in tax litigation to the 
IRS. See A. YOSHIURA, TAX POLICY: CAPITOL HILL FIGHT TO CURB IRS ABUSES 8 (U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce Services Watch, July 1987) (recognizing that burden of proof provision 
was "hotly debated"). 
186. How can any other conclusion be reached concerning the bill's surveillance provisions, 
which blatantly overlap the provisions of the Privacy Act? Two former IRS Commissioners 
might agree with this observation. In their view, the entire bill is "nothing but a political exer· 
cise, with the Service playing the role of whipping post." "Taxpayer's [sic] Bill of Rights" 
Prompts Former Commissioners to Ask: "What's New?," TAX NOTES, Mar. 2, 1987, at 853. 
187. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7430 (1982) (adopted in 1982, the section permits awards of attorney's 
fees and other costs to taxpayers when the IRS takes an unreasonable litigation position). 
* The author thanks Professors Leon E. Irish and Douglas A. Kahn of the University of 
Michigan Law School for their valuable guidance concerning this Note. 
